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Comment
THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT AND STATE
COMMISSION REGULATION
Douglas N. Jones*
Thepassageof the NationalEnergy Act by Congressin 1978 marked a new era
offederal involvement in the areaofutilitiesregulation. Although thepurposeof the
Act is timely in light of the current energy situation,implementation of itsprovisions
may haveprofound ramificationson statepublic utility commissions. In this Comment, the author draws upon his experience in the areato offer his interpretationof
theAct's basicprovisions. In addition,he examines the currentstatus of implementation byfocusing on the Public Utilities Commission of Ohio. Finally, the author
presents what he predicts to bepitfalls andprospects surroundingthe Act.
INTRODUCTION

dramatic exceptions,' Congress has historically
paid little attention to public utilities. Until recently, there
was slight impetus for congressional action-state public utility
commissions appeared to adequately regulate the industry; the
field was highly technical; and in "good" times-periods of declining costs-there was little economic need for federal intervention. The effect of the 1974 oil embargo on national energy affairs,
and the resulting heightened focus on related energy issues,' led
Congress to exercise more regulatory control in the energy field,
particularly in the electric and gas utility sectors. The postembargo congressional activity in the energy area probably rivals
the public utility legislation of the 1930's.3 Moreover, the legislaWITH A FEW

* Director, The National Regulatory Research Institute and Professor of Regulatory
Economics, Ohio State University; B.A. (1955), University of New Hampshire; M.A.
(1956), Ph.D. (1960), Ohio State University.
1. E.g., Telecommunications Competition and Deregulation Act of 1979, S. 622, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Communications Act of 1979, H.R. 3333, 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1979); Natural Gas Act of 1938, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1976); Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z-6 (1976).
2. Post-embargo factors contributing to the increase in congressional action in the
energy field include: the quest for energy conservation; the earnings squeeze on utilities
coupled with the resulting problem of attracting capital to the utility industry; the growing
public suspicion that regulation was a contributor to price level inflation; the amplification
of the consumer movement; the publicly perceived need for an energy policy; and the unusual profitability of the fuel industries.
3. The upturn in congressional attention to the energy industry after the oil embargo
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tion has become more specific-the bills have become betterresearched and increasingly particular in nature.' At the same

time, certain ideological inhibitions surrounding federal regulation have fallen by the wayside-liberal proposals would have
changed the basic market structure itself' and even members traditionally protective of states' rights have supported bills which
bring the federal hand to bear upon areas previously regulated by

the states.6 The National Energy Act of 1978 (NEA) 7 stands as
the highwater mark of federal utility legislation during the past
decade in terms of specificity, degree of adjustment of federal and
state rules, and long term regulatory implications.'
Although NEA has been in effect only a short time, and it is
clearly too early to render conclusions about the success of its implementation in meeting its stated goals, a preliminary assessment
is demonstrated by a comparison of the legislation introduced during that period. Prior to
the winter of 1973-74, there were fewer than 60 utility regulation bills introduced. During
the 93rd Congress (1973-74), 127 energy-related bills were introduced with 5 pertaining
only to electric utilities. During the 94th Congress (1975-76), 201 energy-related bills were
introduced; 84 of the bills pertained to electric utilities. During the 95th Congress
(1977-78), 111 energy-related bills were introduced; 51 of the bills pertained to electric
utilities. Despite the diverse subject matter covered by those bills, the legislators appeared
to be focusing primarily on uniform state regulation rather than on establishing stronger
federal regulation through such arms as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(FERC).
4. Congress has spoken out on such specifics as automatic adjustment clauses, advertising expenses, and the design of electric utility rate schedules, Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 16, 30, 42, 43, 47 U.S.C.); accounting for investment tax credits, for utilities, Long,
Report of the Comm. on Finance, S. REP. No. 437, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 37-39 (1971); and
accelerated depreciation for utilities, Reed, Report of the Comm. on Ways and Means, H.
R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 12-25 (1954).
5. See, eg., Petroleum Industry Competition Act of 1975, S. 2387, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess., 121 CONG. REC. 29645 (1975).
6. Note, for example, the broad-based support in the House for its version of the
National Energy Act which imposed so many mandatory provisions on state commission
regulation of electric power. See text accompanying notes 12-20 infra.
7. The National Energy Act of 1978 cumulatively refers to five statutes which were
enacted on November 9, 1978: the Energy Tax Act of 1978 (ETA), Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92
Stat. 3174 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 19, 23, 26 U.S.C.); National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA), Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3206 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 42 U.S.C.); Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978 (NGPA), Pub. L. No.
95-621, 92 Stat. 3350 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.); Powerplant
and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978 (FUA), Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat.: 3289 (1978)
(codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30 U.S.C.); Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act
of 1978 (PURPA), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections
of 15, 16, 30, 42, 43, 47 U.S.C.).
8. Since NEA, the number of federal bills introduced has sharply declined, perhaps
indicating the adoption of a "wait and see" attitude until the "returns are in" on the workings of NEA.
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of its uneven progress can now be made. This Comment considers
NEA in its five principal parts as its implementation bears on the
policy and public administration aspects of electric and gas utility
regulation.
The Comment briefly traces the legislative history of NEA;
particular attention is then given to the reactions of state regulatory commissions as reflected in the Public Utilities Commission
of Ohio (PUCO). Finally, some commentary on the potential pitfalls and prospects for NEA implementation is presented.

I.

THE NATIONAL ENERGY ACT

A.

Legislative History

The legislation that became the National Energy Act of 1978
evolved from the National Energy Plan introduced to the nation
by President Carter on April 20, 1977. 9 The President's plan for
utility reform concentrated on three areas: altering utility rate
structures, changing the measuring and recording of consumption,
and regulating the transmission and distribution of electric power.
Specifically, the goals of the plan regarding electric utilities were
to (1) "require" the phase out of declining block rate schedules;
(2) "require" utilities to offer off-peak rates; (3) "require" greater
reliance on interruptible power; (4) "prohibit" master metering in
favor of individual metering; and (5) "authorize" the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to require expansion of
utility interties and wheeling arrangements.' 0
The Administration's utility reform proposals were basically
enacted, albeit in a less mandatory form and with implementation
emphasis on state rather than federal commissions." Congress
also entered the debate over rate reform, particularly the declining
block rate issue and the time-of-day pricing question. The House
bill established "minimum standards respecting the rates at which
9. The National Energy Plan was introduced during an address to a joint session of
Congress. 13 WEEKLY COMP. OF PREs. Doc. 566 (Apr. 20, 1977). The National Energy
Act was introduced as a single plan to the House of Representatives on May 2, 1977. H.R.
6831, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG,. REC. H3905 (1977). It was introduced as a single
plan in the Senate on May 5, 1977. S.1469, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., 123 CONG. REC. S7097
(1977).
10. S. REP. No. 442, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7903, 7919. In the case of gas utilities, the wording was "authorized to adopt,
and require implementation, of similar policies applicable to gas utilities." Id.
11. Many of the enacted provisions of the National Energy Plan that concern public
utilities are found in Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA),
Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42, 43,
47 U.S.C.).
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[electric] energy is sold. .... 12 These rate design standards included requirements that rates be "cost based" and that a rate
schedule not show declining consumption rates unless the "utility
shows in an evidentiary hearing that [the] decrease reflects the de...13 There
crease in [the] cost of providing electric service.
were two exceptions to this strict approach. First, lower rates
would be permitted for essential needs of residential consumers.14
Second, lower rates would be permitted where the purpose is to
avoid significant economic hardship to residential consumers.' 5
Under the House version, electric rates for all classes of customers
would be computed on a time-of-day basis which reflects cost-ofservice "unless those rates have been determined not to be costeffective" by the regulatory authority.' 6 The House Committee
also discussed marginal cost pricing concepts for the peakload;
however, such provisions were not included in the final House
bill. 7 Selection of the method for prescribing rates was delegated
to state rather than federal authorities, with the restriction that the
outcome must meet "minimum standards for rates."' 8 Further,
consumer rates must reflect the cost of service on a seasonal basis
unless such rates are not cost-effective.' 9 The FERC was granted
the opportunity to provide voluntary price guidelines for rate determination for peakload, seasonal, and interruptible power.20
In December 1977, the House and Senate conference committee reached agreement on retail electric ratemaking. The compromise in general contained the detailed utility subject matter of the
House bill, but adopted alternative Senate language providing for
milder federal prescriptions on ratemaking and placing the bur12. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 511(a).

13. Id. § 511(a)(1).
14. Id. § 511(b)(2)(B).
15. Id.
16. Id. § 51 1(a)(2)(A). The bill provided that cost-effectiveness exists when "the longrun benefits are likely to exceed the metering costs associated with the implementation of"
the time-of-day rates. Id. § 51 l(a)(2)(C).
17. The House Committee stated that when "the increment in total costs to a utility
caused by the requirement to supply additional energy during peak hours is different from
the increment in costs if that energy were supplied during off-peak hours, then that difference should be reflected in rates." H. REP. No. 496, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 137, reprintedin
[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 8247, 8580.
18. H.R. 8444, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. § 532(a).
19. Id. § 51 1(a)(2)(B). The cost-effectiveness requirement in this section refers to the
effect that seasonal rates have on the consumption patterns of each class of electric consumers. Id. The bill also required that interruptible power rates be offered to consumers. Id.
§ 51 l(a)(2)(E).
20. Id.§511(a)(3).
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den of implementation on the states rather than on the federal
government.2 '
This compromise on attitudes is amply demonstrated by a review of the final provisions. The retail rate provisions adopted
only allow the Secretary of Energy the right to enter state rate
cases and present evidence on rate design that would encourage
conservation and more efficient use of resources. 22 Additionally,
state commissions would be required to hold hearings and issue
findings within three years on the "appropriateness" of implementing five "ratemaking standards:" time-of-day rates, seasonal
rates, cost-of-service pricing, interruptible rates, and load management techniques; declining block rates were prohibited unless
cost-justified. 23 The Secretary of Energy was granted the right to
seek judicial review of a state commission decision on these
ratemaking concepts if the Department of Energy (DOE) had participated in the original state commission proceeding.2 4 The state
commissions were also required to hold hearings within two years,
and to the extent they determined "appropriate," to adopt
prohibitions on master metering; procedures for reviewing automatic adjustment clauses; procedures prohibiting rate discrimination against solar, wind, and other small systems; procedures to
provide adequate information to consumers; prohibitions on
charging ratepayers for certain advertising; and procedures to protect ratepayers against abrupt termination of service.2 5
The controversial issue of automatic adjustment clauses
(AAC) led to disparity between the Committee statement and the
enacted legislation. The Committee statement seemingly condones discretionary review by state commissions,2 6 yet the NEA
21.

JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONG., H.

CONF. R. No.

1750, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 63 reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 7797
[hereinafter cited as JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT].
22. Id. at 81, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7815.

23. 92 Stat. 3122 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d) (West Supp. 1979)).
24. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 82, reprintedin [19781 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7816. This conforms to the House version of the bill, as the

Senate version permitted the Department of Energy (DOE) to appeal only if "invited" to
do so by a party to the appeal. S. 2114, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. § 6(c) (1977).
25. 92 Stat. 3123 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623 (West Supp. 1979)).
26. The Committee expressed its position that state commissions should review AAC's
to ensure that they were providing incentives for efficient use of energy resources and that
state commissions could allow AAC's to cover operating expenses as well as fuel costs. The
Committee took no position on the amount state commissions may allow to be passed
through to the customers, thus preserving full state discretion. JOINT EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 79-80, reprintedin[1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at

7813-14. Additionally, increases in operating costs due to increased taxes could not be
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contains a prohibition against AAC's without a prior evidentiary
hearing, regardless of any finding that efficiency incentives are
built in or that AAC's are necessitated by the immediate shortterm financial obligations of the utility.27 The Committee statement requires that every AAC be reviewed at least every four
years by the state regulatory authority to determine if the clause
encourages efficient use of resources and at least biennially to insure maximum economies in purchases and operations affecting
the utility's rates.2 8
The differences on wholesale power were generally resolved in
favor of the House bill on interconnections, wheeling, and pooling.29 It was agreed to let FERC order interconnections "on its
own motion; 3 0 the original Senate language would have allowed
31
FERC to do this only on the request of an affected party.
Consumer representation and financial assistance to state regulatory authorities were also provided for in the conference agreement. The Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration
(FEA) was authorized to make grants for additional staffing for
state commissions, to facilitate public participation in commission
proceedings, and to encourage the development of experimental
rate structures for electric utilities.3 2
The remaining non-tax features of the Energy Bill that are important in this area are the fuel conservation program and the utility home weatherization program. The first of these basically
follows the thrust of the President's plan to force new and existing
recovered through an AAC where such taxes were imposed as inducement for the utility to
convert from oil and natural gas. Id.
27. 92 Stat. 3126 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2625(e) (West Supp. 1979)). Increases
which would reflect a rise in the cost of centrally purchased power would also be permitted.
Id.
28. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 79-80, 96, reprinted in [1978]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7813-14, 7830.
29. Id. at 90-95, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7824-29.
30. Id. at 90, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 7824.
31. S. 2114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.
The compromise reached allows FERC to order wheeling if certain protections of competition are written into the law. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 91,
reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 7825. The issue of order pooling was
resolved by language allowing "cooperative" dispatch of power. Id. at 95, reprinted in
[19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws at 7829.
32. The Energy Conservation and Resource Renewal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6808 (West
Supp. 1979) [Pub. L. No. 95-617, Title I, § 142, 92 Stat. 3134]. Those duties of the Administrator of FEA were later transferred to the Secretary of Energy. JOINT EXPLANATORY
STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 87-88, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
7821-22.
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power plants, and certain industrial plants, to switch from oil and
natural gas to coal and nuclear fuels. Some waivers and exemptions would be allowed, both temporary and permanent, and FEA
would be granted the additional and expanded authority. 33 The
second of these took the form of a requirement that state utility
regulatory agencies oversee a utility home weatherization program allowing utilities to install energy conservation equipment
for customers and make loans for that purpose.34 Utilities would
also have to offer to conduct energy audits in customers' homes
35
and provide customers with lists of other installers and lenders.
B.

Coverage

Of the five pieces of legislation which comprise NEA,36 all but
the Energy Tax Act will have a direct and substantial impact on
the responsibilities and agendas of state public utility commissions.
1. Public Utility Regulatory PoliciesAct
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA) covers
electric utilities selling more than 500 million kilowatt-hours annually (other than for resale) and gas utilities selling 10 billion
cubic feet annually (other than for resale).37
PURPA's stated purposes are: (a) conservation of the energy
supplied by utilities; (b) optimally efficient use of utility fuel resources and capital facilities; and (c) equitable rates to electric and
gas consumers.38
In order to meet these purposes, eleven federal policy standards were adopted. Six of the eleven are ratemaking standards,
covering cost-of-service, 39 declining block rates,"° time-of-use
rates, 4 1 seasonal rates, 41 interruptible rates43 and load-management techniques. 44 The remaining five policy standards cover
33. H. REP. No. 543, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 7673, 7691.
34. Id. at 11-16, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 7680-85.
35. Id. at 12, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS AT 7681.
36. See note 7 supra.
37. 92 State. 3121 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2612(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
38. Id. at 3120 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2611 (West Supp. 1979)).
39. Id. at 3122 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979)).
40. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(2) (West Supp. 1979)).
41. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(3) (West Supp. 1979)).
42. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(4) (West Supp. 1979)).
43. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(5) (West Supp. 1979)).
44. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(d)(6) (West Supp. 1979)).
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master metering, 45 automatic adjustment clauses, 46 consumer information,4 7 procedures for termination of electric service, 48 and
advertising.49
PURPA requires state commissions to consider the six
ratemaking standards. 50 After such consideration, there is no obligation to adopt such standards unless applicable state law requires adoption where the evidence is persuasive. 5 For this
reason, state public utility commission decisions on these standards must be reached in public, be in writing, and be reviewable
in state court. 2 However, there is a legal obligation to adopt the
five nonratemaking standards provided the state commission de53
termines them to be appropriate and consistent with state law.

Consequently, while PURPA is mostly discretionary as to the outcome of state public utility commission deliberations on these
eleven matters, it is compulsory as to what must be considered.
The Act, however, does impose certain mandatory requirements on state commissions. For example, each state commission
must: (a) officially acknowledge to DOE its ratemaking authority
with respect to the utilities listed by DOE as being covered by the
act;54 (b) complete its consideration process for the ratemaking

standards within 3 years,55 and for the additional regulatory standards within 2 years;56 (c) include public notice and public hearings in its consideration process, 57 and allow consumer and
federal participation; 58 (d) render a written determination which is
based upon its findings and the evidence presented at hearings,
and which is made available to the public; 59 (e) determine to the
maximum extent practicable, cost-of-service on the basis of a
method that identifies cost differences by both time-of-use and
45. Id. at 3124 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979)).
46. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979)).
47. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(3) (West Supp. 1979)).
48. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(4) (West Supp. 1979)).
49. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(b)(5) (West Supp. 1979)).
50. Id. at 3121 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
51. Id. This lack of compulsion is in keeping with the goal of PURPA to supplement
otherwise applicable state law. Id. In other terms, adoption would only be required where
failure to adopt the standards would be arbitrary and capricious.
52. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2621(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979)).
53. Id. at 3124 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2623(a)(l)-(2) (West Supp. 1979)).
54. Id. at 3121 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2612(c) (West Supp. 1979)).
55. Id. at 3123 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2622(b)(2) (West Supp. 1979)).
56. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2622(b)(1) (West Supp. 1979)).
57. Id. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
58. Id. at 3128 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2631(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1979)).
59. I1d. (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2621(c)(2), 2623(c) (West Supp. 1979)).
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major cost category (in prescribing such a method, the commission must take marginal costs into account);60 (f) report annually
to DOE, in such manner as DOE may prescribe, on its progress in

carrying out the act, including its rationale for "grandfathering"
any prior proceedings. 6 '
Although PURPA was designed to apply predominantly to
electric utilities, it has limited application to gas utilities as well.6 2
Rate regulations of natural gas utilities, however, has been deferred.63
2. NationalEnergy ConservationPolicy Act
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act (NECPA) requires, inter alia, large electric and gas utilities,64 and therefore
state commissions, to play a central role in carrying out the federal
policy of encouraging residential energy conservation. 6 5 NECPA
requires each covered utility to: (a) inform all its residential customers of suggested conservation measures, including costs and

savings; (b) distribute a list of qualified suppliers, installers and
financers; (c) offer to conduct on-site home energy audits; (d) offer
to arrange the installation and financing of conservation measures
selected by its customers; (e) offer to allow repayment of the conservation loans through its regular periodic billing procedures.6 6

One of the key provisions of NECPA is the development of a

"residential conservation service" (RCS). 67 Although the legal requirements to offer the RCS are imposed directly upon the coy-

60. Id. at 3125 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2625(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
61. Id. at 3128 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2626(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
62. Id. at 3149 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3201 (West Supp. 1979)). PURPA was intended to serve as a comprehensive national energy policy. H.R. 95-543, 95th Cong., Ist
Sess. 3, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 7673. The specific titles of
PURPA reflect the areas covered: electric utilities (Title I), natural gas utilities (Title III),
small hydroelectric power projects (Title IV) and crude oil transportation systems (Title V).
92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2601 (West Supp. 1979)).
63. Id. at 3152 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3206 (West Supp. 1979)).
64. Provisions of NECPA are applicable to electric utilities selling more than 750 million kilowatt-hours annually (other than resale) and gas utilities selling more than 10 billion cubic feet annually to residential customers. Id. at 1132 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3812 (West Supp. 1979)).
65. Id. at 3212 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8213(c) (West Supp. 1979)). For a discussion of state public utility commissions' role in carrying out this policy, see H.R. CONF.
REP. No. 1751, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1978), reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 8134, 8134-35.
66. 92 Stat. 3215-16 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8216 (West Supp. 1979)).
67. Id. at 3210 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8211 (West Supp. 1979)). The RCS covers
such conservation measures as caulking, weather-stripping, storm doors, and clock thermostats. Id.
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ered utilities, the governor of each state, or any state agency
specifically authorized under state law to do so, is given the option
of developing and administering a statewide RCS program subject
to rules prescribed by DOE. 6 8 No matter what form these programs take, the public utility commissions will necessarily be affected because all costs incurred by regulated utilities in
complying with this conservation program are ultimately subject
to public utility commission approval.69
Finally, NECPA requires DOE to assume direct responsibility
for the conservation programs of all covered utilities in any state
which does not have an approved plan, decides not to participate,
or inadequately carries out an approved plan.7 °
3.

Powerplant andIndustrialFuel Use Act

The Fuel Use Act (FUA) is designed to encourage utilities to
switch from oil and natural gas generation to coal and nuclear

generation by prohibiting the use of natural gas or oil in new electric powerplants, as well as the use of natural gas in existing power
plants. 7 ' The primary impact of FUA on state utility regulation is
derived from the fact that compliance costs incurred by regulated

utilities are subject to public utility commission review and approval.7 2 Because of its focus, FUA has uneven impact among
states.73
68. Id. at 3212 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8213(c) (West Supp. 1979)). All regulated
utilities must be included in such state plans and nonregulated utilities, such as municipalities and co-ops, may be included. Id. at 3214 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8215(a) (West
Supp. 1979)). Either the state governor or an authorized state agency may devise and manage the program. Id. at 3212 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8213(c) (West Supp. 1979)).
69. Id. at 3213 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8214(a)(4) (West Supp. 1979)). As a result,
NECPA provides accounting provisions to deal with these compliance costs. Id. at 3216
(codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8216(c) (West Supp. 1979)).
70. Id. at 3220 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8220 (West Supp. 1979)).
71. Id. at 3291-92 (codified at42 U.S.C.A. § 8301(b) (West Supp. 1979)). Exemptions
are allowed on numerous grounds, but each exemption must be specifically requested and
approved by DOE. Id. at 3299 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8321 (West Supp. 1979)). Specified grounds for permanent and temporary exemptions are contained within FUA. See id.
at 3299-305 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 8321-8324 (West Supp. 1979)). Any exemptions
granted to an electric utility by DOE may be conditioned upon the use of "such fuel conservation measures" as will reduce the amount of prohibited fuel consumed as a result of
the exemption. Id. at 3304 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 8324 (West Supp. 1979)).
72. Id. at 3330 (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 841 1(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979)).
73. For example, in a state like Texas, a large portion of the generating facilities is
fueled by oil and natural gas. The proper policy and accounting method for handling the
massive obsolescence of these plants contrived by a forced changeover to coal and nuclear
energy is an important and unresolved issue.
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4. Natural Gas Policy Act
The Natural Gas Policy Act (NGPA) extends federal regulation of natural gas pricing to the intrastate market,74 previously
subject only to state regulation and provides for the gradual removal of all federal price regulation by 1985." 5
The Act further requires that state-determined distribution
company rates for ultimate consumers be fully consistent with the
incremental pricing aspects of the federally-determined pipeline
price.7 6
While it is assumed that incremental pricing for pipeline transactions can be handled within the prevailing institutional arrangements-that is, among the pipeline, the distribution company, and
the federal government-the pass-through provision requires a
federal role in the area previously reserved to the
states--establishing distribution company rates for ultimate consumers. 77 This new federal role in gas distribution ratemaking
will necessarily affect state utility commissions, which may also be
affected by the Secretary of Energy's new authority to prohibit
certain pipeline curtailments, 78 and by the President's emergency
authority to allocate gas supplies and allow extraordinary gas
purchases.79
5.

Energy Tax Act

The purpose of the Energy Tax Act (ETA) is to provide tax
incentives for the production and conservation of energy. 0 This
purpose is implemented in three general areas: tax credits for residential conservation measures; 8 ' transportation, including a gas
guzzler tax,82 credits for van pooling,8 3 and removal of excise tax
on buses;84 and changes in business investment credit to encourage conservation of oil and gas or to encourage new energy
74. 92 Stat. 3363 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3315 (West Supp. 1979)).
75. Id. at 3369 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3331 (West Supp. 1979)).
76. Id. at 3378 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3345(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
77. Federal involvement is accomplished by a provision authorizing the U.S. Attorney
General to enforce the pass-through provision. Id. at 3402 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 3414(b)(5) (West Supp. 1979)).
78. Id. at 3395 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 3392(a) (West Supp. 1979)).
79. Id. at 3381-88 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 3361-63 (West Supp. 1979)).
80. Id. at 3174.
81. Id. at 3175-80 (codified at I.R.C. § 44C).
82. Id. at 3180-94 (codified at I.R.C. § 4064).
83. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 46(c)(6)).
84. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 4483(c)).
85. Id. at 3194-3201 (codified at I.R.C. §§ 46(a)(2), 48(1)).
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technology." Of special note are the additions to the Investment
Tax credits for utilities.8 6
C. Attitudes andAdministration
Not surprisingly, many of the concerns and attitudes expressed
during the course of passage of the NEA continue in its implementation. 7 It seems fair to summarize the stance of the several
parties to the issue in the following fashion.'
Congress, under substantial and sustained criticism for its failure to produce an energy policy, felt the need for constructive action. It is likely that designing and passing legislation in the
86. Id. at 3195 (codified at I.R.C. § 46(c)(3)).
87. Three offices of DOE are primarily responsible for NEA implementation. Under
PURPA, FERC is responsible for rulemaking on electric cost-of-service reporting, 16
U.S.C.A. § 2643 (West Supp. 1979), and for various bulk power authorities. Id. § 824j.
Also under PURPA, the Economic Regulatory Administration (ERA) is responsible for
title I (except for section 133) title III, and portions of title VI. Specific responsibilities of
ERA include promulgating lists of covered utilities and identifying the responsible state
commissions, id. § 2612(c), 15 U.S.C.A. § 3201(d) (West Supp. 1979); establishing requirements for annual state commission reports and reporting to Congress, 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 2626(a) (West Supp. 1979), 15 U.S.C.A. § 3201(d) (West Supp. 1979); intervening in state
commission proceedings, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2631, 2633 (West Supp. 1979), 15 U.S.C.A.
§ 3205 (West Supp. 197.9); promulgating voluntary guidelines and technical assistance
materials, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 2641, 2642 (West Supp. 1979); providing financial assistance to
commissions, nonregulated utilities, and consumer offices, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6807-6808 (West
Supp. 1979); reporting to Congress on gas rate design proposals, 15 U.S.C.A. § 3206 (West
Supp. 1979); and funding the National Regulatory Research Institute at the Ohio State
University. 16 U.S.C.A. § 2645 (West Supp. 1979).
Under NECPA, the Assistant Secretary for Conservation and Solar Applications has
overall responsibility for program administration, including promulgation of rules, 42
U.S.C.A. § 8213 (West Supp. 1979), and review of state plans. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8214 (West
Supp. 1979). Under this act, ERA is given the supportive responsibilities of serving as
liaison with state commissions and utilities. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8214(a)(6) (West Supp. 1979).
Finally, ERA is responsible for those portions of the rules relating to cost accounting, 42
U.S.C.A. § 8216(c)(1) (West Supp. 1979), service termination, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8216(e) (West
Supp. 1979), billing, 42 U.S.C.A. § 8216(c)(2) (West Supp. 1979), and utility financing of
residential conservation improvements. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8216(f) (West Supp. 1979).
Under FUA, ERA is responsible for the entire program. 42 U.S.C.A. § 8342 (West
Supp. 1979).
Under NGPA, FERC is responsible for the price regulation and deregulation, 15
U.S.C.A. §§ 3311-33 (West Supp. 1979), including incremental pricing and the associated
pass-through requirements. Id. §§ 3341-48. Also under this act, ERA is responsible for
emergency allocation authorities, id. §§ 3361-75 and gas curtailment policies. Id.
§§ 3391-94.
88. The assessments contained herein were drawn from the author's experiences serving Congress as a Specialist in Public Utility Economics at the Congressional Research
Service during introduction and consideration of NEA, and from subsequent experiences
as Director of the National Regulatory Research Institute, which is assisting state commissions in implementing NEA.
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relatively arcane public utility field appeared to be a more workable alternative than tax or oil targets. The dual forces of recentralization and standardization also were operative in the decision.
After a decade and a half of decentralizing programs and authorities Congress seemed to be reasserting federal dominance, and
NEA may be viewed in that light. Further, the wide diversity and
unevenness in public policy that characterized ninety years of
state public utility commission regulation made this area a tempting candidate for national reform. Reform seemed even more urgent because existing institutional arrangements and current
practices were perceived as not only uneven but inadequate. Another immeasurable, but no less real, impetus for action probably
came from the national and state policy disarray that characterized the country's response to the sequence of oil shortages in
1974-75, natural gas shortages in 1975-76, and coal shortages in
1977-78.
From the point of view of the state regulatory community,
NEA legislation was viewed variously as another encroachment
on traditional state prerogatives, as unnecessary and dated in that
many state commissions were "well ahead" in employing the concepts and practices proposed therein, and as introducing an enormous and burdensome levy on already stretched state commission
resources.
To the utilities themselves, the unfamiliar prospect of national
legislation of a stringent regulatory policy nature appeared disruptive. Longstanding, ongoing relationships and business practices
would be disturbed; additional and burdensome reporting requirements for corporate financial and operating data seemed
likely, and a concerted and cohesive national regulatory effort
would be a much more formidable rival than many separate state
regulatory entities. In this sense there may have been the potential for an unusual alliance between the regulated utilities and
their state regulators with respect to the NEA legislation, though
no such alliance eventuated in the course of the bill's passage.
After the signing of NEA in late 1978, movement began in the
federal and state sectors. Various divisions of DOE set in motion
numerous actions toward implementing the new law; FERC began to establish reporting requirements for utilities as contemplated under section 133 of PURPA. 9 A counterpart committee
89. 92 Stat. 3123 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2623 (West Supp. 1979)).

ENERGY ACT REGULA4TION

of the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners
(NARUC) was formed and sat jointly with FERC.
DOE published a month-by-month schedule of planned implementation activities for 1979.90 Again, formal NARUC committee participation was sought and offered, and the working
relationships here, as with FERC, have been generally amicable.
The pace has been quick and the time for reasoned reflection
short, but most state commissions seem to feel that-so far, at
least-they have adequate access to the process and have been
fairly heard.
Part of this access and hearing opportunity emerged from an
early action by DOE in providing for a series of five identical
"NEA Workshops" throughout the country during January, 1979.
The sessions were open only to state commission staff and commissioners, state energy offices, and offices of state attorneys general. They were designed and presented by the research and
assistance arm of NARUC, the National Regulatory Research Institute (NRRI), in conjunction with the five state public utility
commissions of the workshop locations-Ohio, Colorado, Georgia, Rhode Island, and California. The purpose was to provide a
forum for an informal exchange of views on what NEA involved,
how it might be interpreted, expected difficulties of implementation and compliance, and ways to make implementation and compliance minimally disruptive to state commission regulation. 9 1
While discussions were "off the record" and no transcripts were
made, notes were kept in order to recount and synthesize the proceedings. 92
From a stance that could be characterized as grudging acceptance of NEA, state commission postures have gradually changed
so that now the commissions generally feel NEA was more or less
necessary, and a logical step in the progression of utility regulation. Few-if any-yet see NEA as an opportunity to accomplish
90. Included in the schedule were notice of rulemaking, proposed rules, conduct of
public hearings on such rules, and final rules for the several provisions of PURPA,
NECPA, NGPA, and FUA.
91. Attendance at the five conferences totaled 408, excluding DOE and NRRI participants, and included regulators from 48 states and the District of Columbia. The interests
and backgrounds represented were predominantly law, economics, engineering, accounting, and financial analysis.
92. For a listing of questions and observations frequently discussed during the workshops, see NAT'L REG. RESEARCH INST., REPORT ON THE CONFERENCES ON NAT'L ENERGY ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON STATE UTIL. REG., Contract No. EC-77-C-01-8683, 7-11
(1979).
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what might otherwise not be done, or only be accomplished at a
much later time. As with most actions affecting state regulatory
commissions, individual commission response varies with commission history, size, structure, statutory authority, staff skills, and
membership.
Not surprisingly, those state public utility commissions least
wary of NEA are those that have been most progressive in consideration of many of the standards and guidelines that appear in the
legislation. Compliance could be fairly simple for about seventeen state commissions which have already held "generic hearings", almost all of which encompassed the ratemaking standards
in NEA. Ideally, it would be merely a matter of certifying the
record on particular standards for those commissions to be declared in compliance with important portions of the legislation.9 3
Further, a number of commissions which had generic (or other)
proceedings underway but not finished on the date of enactment
of NEA have wisely taken advantage of the PURPA provision
which allows commissions to incorporate consideration of the
standards in the course of completing such hearings. 9" For example, the Colorado Public Utilities Commission, which had begun
generic hearings over two years before NEA passage, was able to
shape its investigation and final order to maximize the chances of
being in compliance with as many PURPA considerations as possible.9" In its order, that commission wrote:
It is interesting to note that the purposes of Title I of PURPA
resemble strikingly this Commission's goals of regulation.
Moreover, the ratemaking standards outlined in the Act are virtually identical to the issues considered in the generic proceedings. This section of the Decision spells out the provisions of
and the extent of the Commission's compliance therePURPA
96
with.

To briefly capsulize state commission activity in areas of
PURPA other than rate design, some nine states now have tariffs
93. This "grandfathering" is possible through use of a PURPA provision that allows
commission proceedings prior to the date of NEA passage to be "treated as complying with
the [standards] if such proceedings and actions substantially conform to such requirements." PuB. L. No. 95-617, § 124, 92 Stat. 3131 (1978) (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2632
(West Supp. 1979)).
94. Since the course of the energy legislation leading to passage covered approximately an 18-month period, there was ample time and occasion for state regulatory commissions to shape some of their activities in anticipation of the new legislation and the
likely need for compliance with its final provisions.
95. PUB. UTIL. COMMISSION OF COLO., SUMMARY OF DECISION No. C79-I 111, GENERIC RATE PROCEEDING, Case No. 5893 (July 27, 1979).

96. Id. at 2.
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published for solar power-presumably with rates that neither
subsidize nor penalize that form of energy. Most promotional advertising by utilities is now prohibited and service cut-offs reduced
or their standards made more lenient. There has been a marked
tightening up of fuel adjustment clauses both as to verification,
monitoring, and commission surveillance and as to design, which
provide incentives for efficiency, scope, and applicability. Master
metering and load management are among the PURPA items
least far along in state commission consideration.
Focusing on the crucial matter of rate design, twenty-three
commissions have instituted time-of-use rate experiments, and
seasonal and interruptible rates are not uncommon incertain utility systems. There has for some time been a move away from at
least sharply declining block rates in utility company tariffs and
toward flatter rate schedules. So-called lifeline rates have recently
been considered by over twenty commissions (although this is the
one consideration that is not "grandfatherable" under PURPA).
Regarding NECPA, it appears that state commissions have
been active in the home insulation field. More than ten commissions now have such programs in existence; a dozen more are
studying them for implementation. When asked whether they had
encountered new regulatory difficulties arising from the utilities'
foray into the insulation business, seventeen commissions recently
answered in the affirmative and eighteen in the negative.9 7
There are two basic problems confronting commissions in the
home insulation field. One involves cluttering up electric and gas
utility regulation with ancillary activities. After spending years
getting the utilities out of the business of selling appliances and
concentrating instead on the production and distribution of
power, it may be a step backwards to again involve them in the
insulation and lending businesses.
The second is the specific problem of whether a user-charge
philosophy or a collective-benefit philosophy is most desirable in
allocating the expenses of energy audits and residential insulation
projects. The former approach would simply require that those
who use the service and who presumably benefit by it pay for it;
the latter would require that since system savings from the energy
97. R. PROFOZICH AND D. JONES, ELECTRIC AND GAS UTILITY RATE AND FUEL ADCLAUSE INCREASES, Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Rel.and on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation and Federal Services of Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, App.
Table B-XI (U.S. Govt. Printing Office, Sept. 1978).
JUSTMENT

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30:324

conservation activities of individual subscribers will accrue to all
subscribers, the costs should be system-averaged.
Two other provisions of NEA whose implementation is not
very far advanced are power pooling and cogeneration. Despite
the 1936 mandate of the Federal Power Commission "to promote
and encourage" interties among the electric utilities it regulates
"for the purpose of insuring an abundant supply of electric energy
throughout the United States with the greatest possible economy,""8 arrangements for power pooling through physical interconnection of independent electric companies have been
essentially left to the utilities for forty years. NEA gave FERC
authority on its own motion,9 9 upon application of any state commission,1°° or upon application of an electric utility or qualifying
cogeneration facility' ° I to order interconnection and sale, delivery,
or exchange of energy between utilities. Also, FERC can en0 3
02
courage utilities to pool with" or order utilities to wheel for
other utilities or cogeneration facilities. Finally, the legislation
makes clear that FERC can order any electric utility system owning or operating a bulk power transmission facility to add capacity
in order to carry out FERC interconnect' 4 and wheeling' 0 5 orders.
The assumption behind all of this is that further economies
and improved operating efficiencies may be realized through additional combinations of companies. 0 6 Two principal characteristics of utility operations that have allowed efficiencies through
interties are time zone diversity and seasonal diversity. The problem with time zone diversity is that with the national shift in peak
load from winter to summer, the opportunities for making better
use of interconnected systems declines. Summer peak load is less
diverse than winter peak load because air conditioning tends to
run around the clock (as does irrigation demand), resulting in a
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

16 U.S.C. § 824a(a) (1976).
Id. § 824i(d).
Id. § 824i(a)(2).
Id. § 824i(a)(1).
Id. § 824a-l(b); see also id. § 824-1(a).
Id. § 824j.
Id. § 824i(a)(1)(D).
Id. § 824j.
Perhaps the best recent treatment of the issue of further interties is contained in

AN OVERVIEW
OF ECONOMICs, REGULATORY AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS (1976). A new study on the
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, NATIONAL POWER GRID STUDY -

same subject is being conducted at the U.S. Department of Energy.
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relatively long flat load which does not lend itself to power supply
manipulation.
Seasonal diversity between Northern and Southern regions offers more promise for improved load factors. Diversity within the
West Coast is considerable; there is a definite winter peak on the
Pacific Northwest and a definite summer peak in California.
There are similar diversity opportunities in the Midwest, for example, between Nebraska and Manitoba, Canada. Here, as elsewhere, before seasonal diversity can be exploited the benefits of
additional interties must demonstrably outweigh the monetary
and environmental costs and the energy losses in long-distance
transmission.
The legislative requirement of interconnects between utilities
as the public interest dictates seems to include the unique case of
the Electric Reliability Council of Texas, the only regional grouping of utilities not intertied with any other part of the United
States.10 7 This possibility might explain the opposition of certain
conferees to this provision.
Another possibility is the use of dual-purpose power plants.
There is little question that a resurgence of the use of dual-purpose power plants could be a force for increased competition in
the utility sector. Just how influential it could be would depend
on the extent and nature of the resurgence. Competition might
take the form of a local existing utility feeling the pressure from a
locally sited dual-purpose power plant through invidious comparisons of price, cost, efficiencies, and performance. On the other
hand, an existing utility might run the risk of losing major industrial customers who decide to generate their own power as a joint
product to process steam. Finally, an existing utility might experience direct competition from a dual-purpose industrial plant in its
sale of wholesale power to existing distribution systems.
Understandably, there is disagreement whether the introduction of widespread competition in the electric power industry
would be beneficial. One reason that cogeneration has not flourished as a concept is that an industry which operates as a natural
monopoly within a particular service area is understandably reluctant to admit competitors who are not fully in the electric power
107. For a treatment of the legal, economic, and public policy aspects of the Texas
situation see A. KAUFMAN, D. JONES, AND R. POLING, THE ELECTRIC RELIABILITY COUNCIL OF TEXAS INTERTIE SITUATION (Comm. Print 1976).
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business, especially if they do not operate within the same regulatory framework.
It would be expected in the dual-purpose plant situation that
most transmission would be wheeled over someone else's system
because construction of elaborate lines from cogeneratig plants
would prohibit capital saving. The problem of arriving at a fair
cost-based rate under cogeneration arrangements in the wheeling
tariff situation is not significantly different from the general problem already posed by wheeling.
While it would seem fair to reduce stand-by demand charges
to industry in exchange for industrial assumption of a portion of
the burden of providing electric power, at least two difficulties
arise. One is to determine a basis for the amount of the reduction-presumably a cost-avoidance rationale. A second is how to
achieve equity if, as is likely, the particular firm occasioning the
reduction by having cogeneration facilities would not be the beneficiary, or not the only beneficiary, of that reduction.
If the regulatory authority granted an industrial cogenerator a
priority use status at a time of national allocation of fuels, this
might have a notable effect on the competitive position of the firm
in its industrial lines (as opposed to competitors who did not go to
cogeneration in their manufacturing process). Also, if rulemaking
required that when a dual-purpose industrial plant was temporarily shut down its electric power generation would still continue,
this would imply that such generation would be more closely akin
to providing firm power than interruptible power. Tariff rates
could be expected to be higher in the former case than the latter,
and from the point of view of cost allocation (hence, charges for
electricity generated), it could be argued that during industrial
plant shutdown periods all of the cost incurred for continued operation of the plant should be charged to the electric portion of the
enterprise, thus, periodically raising rates.
The question of pricing power from cogeneration facilities
raises more general difficulties and most of these turn on the question of cost allocation. Some of the costs of a dual-purpose plant
would be readily allocated to the industrial process steam portion
of the enterprise and some clearly associated with the electric
cogeneration. But others-both capital costs and operating
costs-that are jointly incurred present the familiar problem of
how much cost should be assigned to generation and how much to
the line of business in which the firm is primarily engaged. This is
particularly complicated where the electric portion is under public
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utility regulation and the other line of business is in the nonregulated sector. This situation allows subsidization of one activity by
the other and perhaps unfair pricing practices through either undercharging or overcharging.
All in all, the usefulness of and opportunity for cogeneration
are likely to depend upon locality and existing generating capacity
and configuration. Thus, very particular circumstances will have
to be present for a cogenerating enterprise to be feasible-even in
the absence of institutional and attitudinal obstacles.
Also in the very earliest stages of implementation is the standard of so-called load management techniques.10 8 Load management can be accomplished either directly by the utility or through
the action of the customer. Many feel that over the long term,
load controls may be a more effective strategy to match system
needs and customer demands than time-of-use rates.
To utility companies, to most economists, and, it seems fair to
say, to most regulators, lifeline rates are inimical to sound economics and good public utility regulation.10 9 On the other hand,
the political attraction of lifeline rates appears almost irresistible
to some consumer groups, to state legislatures, and to Congress.
Including lifeline rates in PURPA was especially awkward in that
the rest of the Act is predicated on "rates that track costs."" 0
Lifeline is the one glaring departure from the norm, and a subsidy
by other ratepayers is clearly implied.
While horror stories abound concerning the difficulties and
failures of most lifeline schemes previously instituted, the main
objections to the schemes are that generally (1) they become subsidies to consumers who use small quantities of electricity, for example, affluent second home owners and people who travel
108. These may include the introduction of hardware which allows the reduction of
maximum kilowatt demand on an electric utility through radio control mechanisms, energy
storage devices, and other load-limiting devices. Some involve signaling the customer that
consumption of power at that particular time will be at high rates because it is peak usage;
others involve intermittent cut-offs of power to particular customers for agreed periods of
time.
109. Lifeline - essentially a type of income maintenance - is a pricing method intended to give relief to the poor as they face increasingly high utility bills. It is based on the
assumption that a certain subsistence amount of electricity is essential to maintain an adequate standard of living. In practice, a lifeline rate typically prices the first several hundred
kilowatt hours consumed monthly by each low-volume residential customer at a rate no
higher than the rate per kilowatt hour (exclusive of demand and customer charges) charged
any other customer in any other block of usage during the same period.
110. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 95-617, § lll(d)(l), 92 Stat. 3122 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A.
§ 2621(d)(1) (West Supp. 1979)).
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frequently, rather than to lower income people; (2) lower income
people, for example, those living in poorly insulated homes are
not necessarily lower consumers of power; (3) low income apartment dwellers whose electric costs are included in the monthly
rental, for which the apartment owner is presumably billed at a
commercial rate, are not benefitted and could even end up paying
more if the commercial class of customers is the class subsidizing
the lifeline rate beneficiaries in the residential class; (4) there is a
misallocation of resources because of the abandonment of pricing
according to cost-based rates; and (5) the problem of income
maintenance is more appropriately and more efficiently handled
through the public welfare system.
Unfortunately, the discrediting of a concept does not assure its
demise where major forces point in another direction. What is
required instead is the creation of more cost-effective ways of
achieving the same laudable goal. In any event, the fact that
PURPA provides that commissions must consider the adoption of
lifeline rates within two years will itself keep the matter in the
forefront of regulatory attention. 1 I
Perhaps the initial "sleeper" in NEA involving state commission regulation was the PURPA section 133 collection and reporting requirements for cost-of-service information for every electric
utility with over 500 million kilowatt hours of retail sales." 2 On
the surface, the provision could be viewed as involving the utilities
on the one hand and FERC on the other. However, as the rules
for implementation of section 133 have evolved, there has been
active state commission participation and a very significant role in
the future for state regulators is apparent.
Section 133 rules require the utilities to file detailed economic,
accounting, financial, and engineering information going to cost13
of-service by November 1, 1980, and biennially thereafter.'
Under rules published in June, 1979, all utilities must make their
111. Only where commissions have already considered lifeline, instituted some alternate scheme, or where the state supreme courts have ruled that authority to prescribe preferential and discriminatory rates for a particular group is lacking will the burden of
complying with this standard be somewhat eased. See, e.g., Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Pub. Util, Comm'n. 590 P.2d 495 (Colo. 1979).
112. 92 Stat. 3132 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 2643 (West Supp. 1979)).
113. Id. Large portions of the information required by the rules have either gone uncollected in the past or, if collected, were not available to the public. A major purpose
behind section 133 was to fill the data gaps and to allow everyone access to the same set of
information - utilities, regulators, customers, intervenors, and policymakers. JOINT ExPLANATORY STATEMENT, supra note 21, at 86, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.

NEws at 7820.
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14
filings with both FERC and the appropriate state commission."
They must collect and report their cost-of-service data both in
"raw" (accounting) form and in "calculated" form on both a
traditional fully-distributed cost basis and on a marginal cost ba-

sis. 115

In performing these calculations, the rule now states that state
commissions can prescribe a methodology for both (or either) the
accounting cost and marginal cost submissions.1 1 6 In the absence
of such prescription, a utility is free to choose whatever cost-ofservice methodologies it prefers in presenting these calculations.
Many commissions are learning the importance of specifying a
preference-so that the wealth of data to be filed in the future will
intentions on the
be consistent with earlier decisions or present
7
employed."
methodologies
cost
of
matter
Under the rules, state commissions also have a role in reviewing utility applications for extension of compliance past November 1980, and for exemptions from compliance. Such applications
will go simultaneously to FERC and the appropriate state commission, and the latter can concur with or oppose the application
upon review. 188 Further, a state commission can request a blanket
extension or exemption for all utilities under its jurisdiction. 1 9
Although there is little tangible evidence on the current status
of state implementation of PURPA, from studies made, 2 0 the majority of state commissions feel that few or only some of the
PURPA standards can be met through grandfathering. Also, a
majority of the commissions have adopted a plan, or are currently
formulating a plan, to comply with the standards. The Economic
Regulatory Administration (ERA) published final rules in August
114. Rules and Regulations for Part 290 - Collection of Cost of Service Information
Under Section 133 of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 44 Fed. Reg.
33868 (1979).
115. Id. at 33875. The data will cover rate base and operating cost information; will be
for generation, transmission, and distribution activities for each utility; and will be shown
for both peak and off-peak hours. Id. at 33869-73.
116. Id. at 33875.
117. For example, if a commission has already agreed on a particular marginal costing
method, it presumably would want to ensure that jurisdictional utilities use that method for
their reporting requirements under section 133.
118. Id.at 33876.
119. Id.
120. Two of the surveys relied upon for these conclusions are NATIONAL ECONOMIC
RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., Summary of State Regulatory Commissions'Activities Relating

to Title I of the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (1979) and PURPA Score Card,
ELECTRICAL WEEK, 3-4 (Aug. 27, 1979).
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1979 for the reporting by state regulatory authorities of progress
on consideration of the ratemaking and other standards in
PURPA.12 1 In publishing the rules, ERA refused to limit the annual report to a mere summary of actions and instead required
2
completion of a detailed questionnaire and a summary thereof.1
In doing so, it emphasized that Congress viewed the annual reports as "a vehicle for accurately measuring the progress of the
States in order to provide a basis for legislative oversight by the
Congress."' 2 3 Presumably this will be a special spur to state action on implementation.
II.

OHIO IMPLEMENTATION

The Public Utilities Commission of Ohio (PUCO) offers an
excellent case study to illustrate the problems surrounding NEA
implementation. 2 4 The task here is to describe the attitudes and
approaches of this important commission, to compare them with
the foregoing analysis, and to ascertain the extent of NEA implementation in Ohio.
PUCO is properly considered one of the major state regulatory
commissions. It is relatively large, with approximately three hundred employees; it is rather well funded, with a total budget of
$9.5 million for fiscal year 1980;125 and it is very active in its case
load. Thus, it is not surprising that PUCO is well advanced toward meeting many of the NEA requirements and is confident of
its capacity to fully comply in a timely fashion. For purposes of
PURPA, the Commission's major responsibility is overseeing
seven investor-owned utilities: Cincinnati Gas & Electric Co.,
Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., Columbus & Southern Co.,
Ohio Edison Co., Ohio Power Co.,
Dayton Power & Light 12Co.,
6
and Toledo Edison Co.
At the time NEA was passed, PUCO's attitude was perhaps
121. 44 Fed. Reg. 47264-66 (1979) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 463).
122. Id.
123. Id.at 47264.
124. This discussion draws from, among other sources, information gathered from interviews with the Honorable C. Luther Heckman, Chairman, PUCO (Aug. 31, 1979); John
D. Borrows, Director of Utilities, PUCO (Aug. 20, 1979); and Douglas Maag, Electric Rate
Analysis Section, PUCO (Aug. 28, 1979).
125. About $5.1 million of this budget is for the regulation of electric and gas utilities.
126. See PUCO, ANNUAL REPORT, FISCAL YEAR 1979. While PUCO has jurisdiction
over Monongahela Power Company operations within Ohio, the company's sales in Ohio
are not large enough to qualify it as a "covered utility" under PURPA. PUCO anticipates
that the West Virginia Public Service Commission, the commission primarily responsible
for Monongahela, will share its filings with them.
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similar to that of most state utility commissions. It could be characterized as substantial concern about the magnitude of the burden of new levies in the course of compliance, concern about the
tight time schedule imposed, apprehension about access to and
impact on the rulemaking that would be necessary, worry that the
widely-touted "voluntariness" of the legislation was, or would become, in practical effect mandatory in nature, concern that federal
implementation would involve active intervention in state commission proceedings, and apprehension that the legislation might
mark the beginning of an assault on state regulation that would
further erode state commission prerogatives. On the other hand,
PUCO viewed itself as well ahead of the PURPA legislation because it had previously entertained or treated most of the substantive topics in the Act.
By June 1979, PUCO was able to take stock of where it stood
in PURPA implementation and to enunciate an approach to compliance. The various issues were separated into two procedural
categories-generic and case-specific.12 7 By August 1979, Commission staff had developed for promulgation a uniform tariff applicable to both gas and electric utilities. The effect of the tariff
would be to grandfather master metering to current locations and
require a cost-benefit analysis before such service could prospectively be offered.1 8 Staff also prepared a uniform customer billing format and related customer information for both gas and
electric utilities with the hope that they would satisfy the PURPA
requirement covering information to consumers.' 2 9 PUCO staff
believes current procedures for reviewing Ohio utilities' fuel adjustment clauses comply with PURPA requirements.
As to the lifeline standard, PUCO staff reports that in every
recent rate-related proceeding, PUCO has considered a lifelinetype structure and determined charges and revenue impacts.
From as early as 1976, PUCO has documentation adequate to
127. In the former category were prohibitions on master metering, procedures for providing adequate information to consumers, protection of ratepayers from abrupt termination of service, and consideration of lifeline rates. In the latter category fell
recommendations regarding advertising expense, cost-of-service, declining block rates,
time-of-day rates, seasonal rates, interruptible rates, and load management techniques.
128. The tariff was ordered by the Commission. Case No. 79-633-GE-UNC (Aug. 8.
1979).
129. The billing format was also ordered by the Commission. Case No.
79-569-GE-UNC (Aug. 8, 1979). The same order established procedures for termination
of gas and electric service in compliance with PURPA. Case No. 79-632-GE-UNC (Aug.

8, 1979).
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form the necessary groundwork for the planned generic proceeding which will address the lifeline standard. 130
With respect to PURPA's section 133 cost-of-service reporting
provisions, the PUCO staff and Chairman worked closely with
counterpart NARUC and FERC officials toward a mutually acceptable compliance plan. Concurrently, PUCO staff has developed Standard Filing Requirements which would dovetail with
PURPA requirements in filling in any data deficiencies perceived
by the staff. Thus, PUCO is well on its way toward meeting
PURPA requirements in the generic situations.

Although PUCO is not yet in compliance with PURPA in the

specific case area, significant progress has been made. Figure 1131

130. In this connection it should be noted that the State of Ohio has in operation an
"Energy Credits Program" funded out of general revenue and designed to assist elderly
and disabled persons with low incomes in paying their heating bills. While not a lifeline
program as such, it provides similar benefits.
FIGURE 1: PURPA IssuEs ADDRESSED BY PUCO STAFF
131.
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contains the six PURPA guideline issues as addressed by PUCO
staff utility-by-utility for the past five years. These entries demonstrate that PUCO is indeed advanced in its consideration of the
standards, though this is not to say conclusively that these considerations comprise satisfactory compliance with the new legislation. It should be noted that of the seven power companies under
PUCO jurisdiction, all but two have had a cost-of-service case
over the period, all have had declining block rates considered, all
but two have had seasonal rates considered, all have had time-ofday rates considered, all but two have had interruptible rates considered, and all have had load management techniques considered. Because PUCO has already devoted substantial staff
resources to so many PURPA standards-particularly rate design
reform-the Commission now feels that implementation will involve a "slight redirection at most-and not a very sharp turn at
32
that."1
On August 15, 1979, applications were due at the ERA for
those states requesting federal financial assistance under either the
PURPA Grant Program or the Innovative Rates Program. PUCO
submitted one of each in the amount of $225,000 for the former
program and $300,000 for the latter. 33 The proposal under the
PURPA Grant Program is directed at two subjects-a lifeline rate
study and the enhancement of PUCO staff analytical capability.
The proposal points out that the Ohio case with respect to lifeline
is unusual because of the existence of the state's Energy Credits
Program.134 Therefore, the Ohio proposal calls for the design of
an analytical technique that allows any lifeline rate benefits to be
measured as incremental benefits over the existing Energy Credits
Program. The objective would be to find the optimal mix between
the energy credits strategy and the lifeline strategy. The second
subject-strengthening staff analytical capability-is pointed toward identifying specific, needed improvements in financial analysis model building; data collection, storage, and retrieval
132. Borrows interview, supra note 124.
133. PUCO, PROPOSAL FOR THE PURPA GRANT PROGRAM 4, submitted to the Office
of Utility Systems, Economic Regulatory Administration, Department of Energy (Aug. 10,
1979) and PUCO, PROPOSAL FOR THE INNOVATIVE RATES PROGRAM, submitted to the
Office of Utility Systems, Economic Regulatory Administration, Department of Energy

(Aug. 10, 1979).
134. See note 130 supra.
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capacity; and documentation and development of regulatory user
guides.
The PUCO proposal under the Innovative Rates Program is
especially noteworthy for its emphasis and assumptions. Its primary focus is on the utilities under PUCO jurisdiction and only
secondarily on the Commission itself. It presumes that each Ohio
utility should have an adequate in-house PURPA implementation
program and that those programs should accomplish a good deal
more than simply responding to the specific data requirements
levied by various regulatory authorities pursuant to PURPA. Accordingly, it envisions that each utility have some system to identify opportunities for rate reform and project development, data
collection and cost analysis, risk assessment, customer involvement, and implementation management. For the Commission's
part, a program of performance monitoring would be devised to
assure satisfactory ongoing rate reforms by each regulated utility.
In conclusion, PUCO attitudes and approaches to NEA seem
to be optimistic. The Commission feels that the federal rulemaking process has gone smoothly, that state access has been good,
and that FERC has been more accessible than DOE. PUCO sees
the federal government as less active in its intervention program
regarding state proceedings and less active in pursuing the marginal cost approach than had been feared. PUCO is more hopeful
that its actions on many of the PURPA standards and guidelines
can be grandfathered for compliance purposes, and is inclined to
believe that an inordinate amount of intervenor activity will not
characterize the course of PURPA implementation in Ohio. Finally, it believes that the development and use of load management techniques will be the key to achieving the main objectives
of the NEA legislation.
The Commission believes that PURPA's section 133 reporting
requirements will be the toughest provisions for all parties to satisfy, yet also feels that when properly functioning, the system will
provide useful data for many regulatory purposes. PUCO is confident that Ohio utilities presently have the capability to gather
and process the data required under the Acts (with perhaps Dayton Power and Light Co. the lead utility in this regard). PUCO
anticipates being restrictive in the area of utility requests for extensions or exemptions from reporting requirements.
As this discussion seems to indicate the PURPA portion of
NEA has received by far the most PUCO attention. In the case of
NECPA implementation, primary responsibility was vested in the
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Ohio Department of Energy by the Governor. This arrangement
has been amicable and PUCO personnel serve on an interagency
task force on the matter. The central issue of who should bear the
financial burden of energy audits and other conservation activities
under NECPA has not yet been faced, nor has the question of
how to account for these costs-whether they should be expensed
or be allowed into the rate base of participating utilities.
The plant fuel conversion provisions of FUA are also being
considered at the Ohio Department of Energy rather than at
PUCO. Interim rules for FUA implementation were issued by
DOE on August 20, 1979.135
The Commission sees NGPA as by far the most complicated
and least understood of the five Acts which comprise NEA.
PUCO knows that it will have to address the incremental pricing
issues contained therein, but it has so far chosen to watch the
course of events of FERC-mandated natural gas incremental pricing in California, Michigan, and Wisconsin, and of hearings now
going on before FERC, before it acts.
While ETA impacts most directly on the U.S. Treasury as an
entitlement under the Investment Tax Credits sections of the Internal Revenue Code,'3 6 it has secondary implications for PUCO.
All seven of Ohio's investor-owned utilities made substantial use
of investment tax credits to the tune of some $46 million in 1978
and $78 million in 1977.137 These monies and their subsequent
handling are of obvious import at the time of formal rate cases.

III.

PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS

A fair assessment of the ongoing implementation of NEA is
that the prospects are good but the pitfalls are many. This assertion is based on what has been developed in earlier sections, and
what is to be discussed here. The several vantage points treated in
this summary appraisal and outlook are those of Congress, the
Federal Department of Energy, the jurisdictional utilities, consumers, and the state regulatory commissions.
The potential pitfall for Congress is the traditional one of
launching a major piece of legislation and failing to exercise its
oversight function in the course of implementation. Congress has
135.
136.
137.
tember,

44 Fed. Reg. 43176 (1979) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. §§ 500-501, 503-506).
I.R.C. §§ 30-50B.
Standard Filing Requirement Forms, Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, Sep1979.
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moved on to other issues and may not return to NEA, even to
follow up with gas utility pricing legislation. While some parties
might be pleased at the prospect of congressional inattention, new
programs suffer in effectiveness when this happens.
In another congressional role, that of provider of appropriations, a danger is that in a tight budget period like the present
insufficient funds may be made available to the Department of
Energy and to the states for orderly and effective implementation
of this wide-ranging and technically complex legislation. While it
is certainly true that after decades of practice in obtaining federal
grants the states are quite skilled at tapping the Treasury, cutting
too deeply into the authorization amounts contemplated for state
NEA implementation would be to encourage failure. It would be
extremely unfortunate and unfair if Congress were to place major
additional levies on states and then fund implementation at a level
just low enough to ensure an inadequate outcome.
Style and tone are difficult characteristics to ascribe to an
agency, but it is almost certain that they will be crucial to the Department of Energy's success in implementing NEA. DOE has so
far avoided the pitfalls of heavy-handedness in its rulemaking and
in use of its intervention powers. 138 It has avoided directly forcing
federal choices on the states by consistently encouraging the states
to make their own decisions under applicable state law. Also,
there is no indication that the grant program will be administered
in a reward-and-punishment fashion with respect to state compliance.
As is usually required for good public administration, a series
of balances needs to be struck. Uniformity and standardization
are inherent in any national policy, but the diversity and ingenuity
of response that characterizes state regulatory behavior should not
be stifled. Inertia of the status quo in utility regulation needs to be
disrupted where it is outdated, but areas of legitimate constancy
should remain untouched. A flexible interpretation of the
grandfathering clause to ease compliance with PURPA standards
where commissions have done a conscientious job is desirable, but
138. In September 1979, the Economic Regulatory Administration said there would be
no change in its method of selecting cases for intervention. Factors to be weighed would
continue to include the opportunity for precedential decision, consonance with PURPA
and energy policy objectives, the regulatory climate in the state, and the potential receptivity to ERA participation. For an early and readable treatment of issues surrounding
PURPA, see Toll, Some Legal and Policy Questions Presentedby the Public Utility Regulatory PoliciesAct, PUB. UTIL. FORT. 46 (Mar. 1, 1979).
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should stop short of allowing commissions to avoid implementation of the Act.
When FERC exercises its new wheeling and interconnect authorities, it should not accept the predisposition of the utilities that
virtually all useful interties have already been accomplished and
that any further wheeling orders would be unreasonably harmful
to existing competitive positions. On the other hand, adopting too
aggressive a stance could mean endless and massive litigation that
serves no one's interest. Encouraging the development of supplemental power sources, such as cogeneration and solar facilities,
can properly mean lowering the institutional and attitudinal barriers to joining these kinds of power to existing utility systems, but
should not involve subsidizing supplemental power through the
ratemaking process. This would counter the cost-tracking and equity goals of the legislation itself. Finally, while it is obviously
important for DOE in administering NEA to ensure that state
commissions meet each and every requirement, it should not
adopt a static checklist mentality in its execution but rather a
longer term, dynamic view of what the legislation ultimately intends and allows.
The goals for the utilities under NEA legislation should be
more stringent, yet more reasoned, regulation. The general inertia
and lethargy that are endemic to monopoly positions will be moderately shaken. The utilities' behavior is likely to be acquiescent,
well short of enthusiastic, on those provisions of NEA having to
do with utility operations (for example, fuel conversion) and practices (for example, rate design matters) where only money is involved. In a sector where expenses are fully recoverable, this is
neither a surprising nor illogical stance to take.
Predicting the utilities' response to the implementation of the
reporting requirements of PURPA section 133 is a good deal more
uncertain. Here the interest of the utilities in being left alone is
compelling. The understandable fear is that information is power,
and that life will never be the same for a utility when all
costs-raw and calculated-are made public, especially in the detail and on the subjects PURPA calls for. Intervenors, regulators,
academics, shareholders, investors, and other utilities will have for
their own purposes information never before available. In the
near future, this may be of relatively little use because the task of
accessing, sorting, digesting, and analyzing the data will be enormous. But over time, perhaps in five to ten years, basic cost data
and operating information will be invaluable to good commission
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regulation and enlightened public policy. A pitfall for the utilities
would be to try to withhold information from the state and federal
commissions, knowing that they are the only source of the data.
Arguments of proprietariness, interpretation, unavailability, undue costliness, and unwillingness are likely, but carried to the extreme would not seem to be in anyone's interest.
The prospects that await consumers under NEA are obscured
by the fact that the impact on consumers is dependent upon the
direction taken by the states in implementing the national program. One can hope that consumers will benefit from better service by the regulatory bodies and greater confidence that regulatory
activities surrounding the power utilities have a more rational,
more evidential, more reasoned basis than they have in the past.
Whether these generalized goals will be realized is a question
whose answer must await the passage of time.
The most important vantage point against which to assess the
pitfalls and prospects of NEA implementation is that of the state
public utility commissions. As mentioned earlier, the unevenness
of state commission resources, statutory underpinnings, and regulatory inclination is such that generalizations about the course of
implementation are especially hazardous. Despite this, some predictions can be ventured.
One pitfall is that state commissions might miss the opportunity presented by NEA. There is the opportunity for at least the
average commission to go through a reflective and systematic
goal-setting exercise for itself. There is also incentive for commissions to become interested and skilled in handling empirical questions, in making economic and statistical analyses, in making
independent assessments and designing alternative forms of regulation. There is an opportunity for a commission to reinforce or
strengthen its programs by using both the letter and spirit of the
NEA legislation and its accompanying grant monies. Commissions should learn to make full informational and analytical use of
the data forthcoming under PURPA by researching and preparing
before holding hearings and making decisions. Presently, many
commissions may not see the opportunity in PURPA for them to
set standards, to require particular submissions of work detail and
logic behind utility proposals, or to advance from a verification
and monitorship role to an independent and creative role.
In addition, there is the danger that state commissions either
will tend to see NEA implementation as a one-shot affair or will
become impatient for results and stop trying when they find a

19801

ENERGY ACT REGULATION

quick panacea. Either case would be unfortunate, as a more useful view of the legislation is one of continued reexamination and
reform over a longer period of time.
Another pitfall facing NEA is a challenge of unconstitutionality by the states. As previously mentioned, regulation of the utilities has traditionally been left to the states.13 9 Thus, a federal
intrusion into this area might be viewed as an unconstitutional
invasion of the police power of a state. 140 Such an action seems
feasible in this situation when one views the position of the state
utility commissions. To many such commissions, the provisions
of NEA seem outdated and superfluous when compared to state
regulation currently being administered. Furthermore, the costs
of implementing NEA place an enormous burden on already
overextended state commission resources.
On May 7, 1979, the State of Mississippi filed an action for a
declaratory judgment in the federal courts. 14 1 The complaint alleges that enforcement of PURPA is unconstitutional as an invasion of state sovereignty and intergovernmental immunity; 42 as
an attempt to misuse the commerce power to regulate utilities exclusively within the state; 143 and as placing an intolerable burden
of time and money on the state, especially by requiring consideration of extremely complex federal regulatory policies as a part of
every rate case under federal procedural rules which repeal any
conflicting state procedural rules. 144
Despite these reservations and contingencies, the overall prospect for implementation is promising. Many attentive public officials are working on successful implementation of these laws, and
a greater amount of good-will has surrounded these actions than
139. It is of interest that during NEA's enactment the traditional roles of the House and
Senate were reversed. Rather than jealously preserving local authority the House pushed
for an all-encompassing mandatory bill. The Senate urged a maximum of state leadership
on the issues with the federal role limited to guidelines and suggested considerations. This
role reversal can be partly explained by the fact that the House acted first on the legislation.
Also to be taken into consideration is the intensive and effective lobbying effort targeted on
the Senate, as well as the fact that the House Committee members and staff seemed convinced that the states would not or could not handle the situation without federal intervention.
140. For a recent Supreme Court decision supporting the sovereignty of the states, see
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
141. Mississippi v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, No. J79-0212(c) (D. Miss.,
complaint filed May 7, 1979).
142. Id. at 9.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 9-10.
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earlier would have been expected. There is no reason to believe
that implementation will not continue to proceed successfully, although more problems may arise as the more complex parts of
implementation are tackled. The state commissioner who predicted that NEA would be "the end of state regulation as we have
known it for the last fifty or sixty years" 14 5 appears to have been
proven wrong. It is the continued full participation of state regulators in the implementation process that will assure a constructive
outcome. And in all events, even if NEA does not fully achieve its
three-fold national goals of energy conservation, efficiency, and
equity, it will almost certainly result in a healthy strengthening of
public utility regulation in the United States.

145. Address by the Honorable Charles J. Cicchetti, Chairman of the Wisconsin Public
Service Commission, before the 90th NARUC Annual Convention, Las Vegas, Nevada
(Nov. 16, 1978).

